COMPETITION ANALYSIS FOR SHARED SPECTRUM WITH A PRIORITY QUEUE MODEL

Lijun Zheng, Feng Liu

ABSTRACT:Spectrum sharing has been proposed as a way to improve the capacity of wireless network by using limited spectrum more efficiently. This paper provides a scenario where a primary service provider shares one spectrum with secondary service providers and competes for a common customer pool with them. It is by using price competition models to study a scenario where a customer chooses a service provider based on the price of the service and the congestion it generated. Here we assume that the primary service provider has absolute priority over the secondary ones and simulate the resulting congestion by preempting the priority queue. We described how the price games result in equilibrium. Particularly, we find out that, when the service time has a little change, the secondary service provider could be expelled out of the system while the primary service provider must supply a price below its expectations if it feels the threat of new entrants as a monopolist. As the available bandwidth increases, the profit of the primary service provider will decrease to zero gradually.

Keywords:Priority Queue Model, spectrum sharing, competition, monopoly, Wardrop balance, Nash equilibrium